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I
INTRODUCTION
Malapportionment of Diet seats is one of the most serious problems
confronting contemporary Japan. After World War II, there was a large-scale
population shift from rural to urban areas in Japan, as in other industrialized
countries. However, the postwar statutes for apportionment of Diet members
have not been fully revised to reflect this shift. This situation exists because
the conservative Liberal Democratic Party and its predecessors, which have
received their main support in the rural areas, have been in power ever since
the war's end, except for a short period during which the Japan Socialist Party
led the government. In the early 1960s, many Japanese people began to
question the degree of malapportionment, and some concluded that it had
passed the bounds of tolerance. At this time, the United States Supreme
Court handed down its celebrated decision in Reynolds v. Sims I which
established the principle of "one person, one vote." This decision undeniably
helped ignite public sentiment in Japan for fair and just representation in the
National Diet. Since the Diet did not fully respond to this demand, the people
inevitably turned to the judiciary for improvement of the situation. Lawsuits
have since been filed one after another in an effort to realize the electoral
equality guaranteed by the Constitution. Yet, the present situation is still far
from satisfactory.
II
THE CONSTITUTION AND AN OVERVIEW OF DEVELOPMENTS IN
APPORTIONMENT LAW
Under the Constitution, apportionment and districting are expressly
within the discretion of the National Diet, which consists of the House of
Representatives and the House of Councillors. The Constitution provides
that "[t]he number of the members of each House shall be fixed by law" 2 and
that "[e]lectoral districts, method of voting and other matters pertaining to
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the method of election of members of both Houses shall be fixed by law." 3
The number of members of the House of Representatives and that of the
House of Councillors were first prescribed in 1947 by two statutes: the
Revised Election Act for Members of the House of Representatives 4 and the
Election Act for Members of the House of Councillors. 5 These two laws,
however, were replaced in 1950 by the Public Officials Election Act, 6 which
provides in Schedule I for the number of Representatives and in Schedule II
for the number of Councillors. The Public Officials Election Act made slight
changes in the number of members of the House of Representatives because
of demographic population shifts already evident at the time of enactment.
To determine apportionment of the House of Representatives, the nation
was first divided into 117 electoral districts, each of which was allocated three
to five seats. The computation was made on the basis of 150,000 electors per
Representative in accordance with the National Census of April 26, 1946.
The number of Representatives was fixed at 466, a number which had not
changed since 1925. As to the apportionment of the House of Councillors,
the total number of its members was fixed first at 250, then at 252 after the
reversion of the Ryukyu Islands to Japan in 1972. Out of this number, 100
were elected at large, with the nation as a whole forming a single electoral
district, and 150 (152 after 1972) were elected from all the prefectures, with
each prefecture comprising a local electoral district. The original method of
election for the members of the House of Councillors to be elected at large
called for electors to cast their votes for the individual candidates of their
choice. In 1982, however, this method was replaced by a form of proportional
representation, 7 according to which electors cast their votes for the list of
candidates submitted by each political party. Seats are allocated to the
candidates of the various parties in proportion to the votes they have
acquired.
The apportionment of members of the House of Councillors to be elected
from local electoral districts was made on the basis of 487,417 persons per
Councillor, a number based on the population of Japan as of April 26, 1946,
divided by 150. However, since the members of the House of Councillors
were to serve six-year terms of office, and half the House was to stand for
election every three years, 8 every prefecture, however small in population,
was allocated at least two seats. Therefore, there was from the beginning an
imbalance of 1 to 2 in the ratio of population per Councillor between the most
populated district and the least populated district.
3. Id. art. 47.
4. Shugiin-giin Senkyo H6 n6 Ichibu o Kaisei suru H6ritsu, Law No. 43, 1947 (amending the
Election Law for Members of the House of Representatives).
5. Sangiin-giin Senkyo H6 (Election Law for Members of the House of Councillors), Law No.
11, 1947.
6. Koshoku Senkyo H6 (Public Officials Election Act), Law No. 100, 1950.
7. Law No. 81, 1982 (amending Public Officials Election Act).
8. 1947 CONST. art. 46.
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Thus, the apportionment of both Houses was made on the basis of the
population of the electorate derived from the National Census of April 26,
L946. Moreover, Schedule I of the Public Officials Election Act makes special
provision for the apportionment of members of the House of Representatives
and states that "[i]t is to be made a practice to correct this Schedule in
accordance with the results of the most recent National Census every five
years from the date of its enforcement."
After 1946, the rural population began to move, and still continues to
move, to cities in large numbers as Japan's industry develops. For this reason,
the relative difference in the ratio of voters per Diet member between the
rural areas and the big cities has been growing, but the National Diet has
failed to make an all-out effort to correct the situation. In the case of the
House of Representatives, there have been only three reapportionment
statutes. The first reapportionment was in July 1964, 9 resulting in an increase
of nineteen members, which barely reduced the disparity in the ratio of the
number of the electorate per Representative to 1 to 2. This, however, proved
to be nothing but a temporary solution. In fact, according to the 1970
National Census, the relative difference between the Third District of Osaka,
which was the most populous district, and the Fifth District of Hyogo, the
least populous one, had reached a ratio of 1 to 4.99.
The second reapportionment plan was put into effect in July 1975.10 It
added twenty more seats in the House of Representatives, yet the disparity
that existed between the Fourth District of Chiba and the Fifth District of
Hyogo was still at 1 to 3.7. This disparity was the result of the Diet's long
negligence in making a decisive move toward correcting the imbalance. What
the Diet had done instead to that point was simply to create and allocate some
seats to extremely disadvantaged districts. This approach avoided the true
problem, however, because the Diet had not tried to deprive rural
constituencies, which were overrepresented in the Diet, of their excessive
seats.
On April 14, 1976, Japan's Supreme Court declared unconstitutional the
rules of apportionment for the members of the House of Representatives at
the time of the general election of 1972, when the maximum relative
difference between electoral districts in the value of each vote was 1 to 4.99.
Despite its ruling of unconstitutionality, however, the Court vacated the
petition for invalidation of the election itself.'' Again, on November 7, 1983,
the Supreme Court hinted that, after a reasonable period of time (which the
Court thought to be five years) had elapsed, it would declare unconstitutional
the rules of apportionment revised according to the National Census of 1975,
under which the maximum disparity had reached the level of 1 to 3.94.12
9. Law No. 132, 1964 (amending the Public Officials Election Act).
10. Law No. 63, 1975 (amending Public Officials Election Act).
11. Kurokawa v. Chiba Prefecture Election Comm'n, 30 Minsh 223 (Sup. Ct., G.B., Apr. 14,
1976).
12. Tokyo Metropolitan Election Comm'n v. Koshiyama, 37 Minsh6I 1243 (Sup. Ct., G.B., Nov.
7, 1983) (reversing 984 HanreiJih6 26 (Tokyo H. Ct., Dec. 23, 1980).
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Those decisions forced the Diet to revise the rules of apportionment a third
time.' 3 The new apportionment plan was called the plan of "eight plus, seven
minus," for it allocated one seat each to eight districts, which were intolerably
underrepresented, and deprived seven districts, which were overrepresented,
of one seat each. With this revision, the traditional electorate system, with
three to five members allocated per constituency,' 4 underwent a partial
change, and brought about four two-member districts and one six-member
district.
With respect to the apportionment of the members of the House of
Councillors to be elected from local districts, the relative difference in the
value of a vote between electoral districts had exceeded constitutionally
tolerable limits, just as in the case of the House of Representatives. On
February 5, 1964, however, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of
Schedule II of the Public Officials Election Act at the time of the 1962
election, in which the maximum disparity between districts had reached a
level of approximately 1 to 4.15 Later, in April 1983, the Supreme Court
again declared valid the rules of apportionment at the time of the 1977
election, in which the maximum difference had been 1 to 5.26.16 The Court
looked to the peculiarities and uniquenesses of the House of Councillors to
uphold the constitutionality of Schedule II, even though the disparity between
districts was more than that which existed in Schedule I for the House of
Representatives. The Diet has yet to make any attempt to correct electoral
imbalances in the House of Councillors.
III
MALAPPORTIONMENT OF DIET SEATS AND JUSTICIABILITY: KOSHAMA
V. CHAIRMAN, TOKYO METROPOLITAN ELECTION COMMISSION
The Japanese Supreme Court first adjudicated the constitutionality of the
apportionment of Diet members in its Grand Bench decision of February 5,
1964, Koshiyama v. Chairman, Tokyo Metropolitan Election Commission.' 7 In the
election for members of the House of Councillors held on July 1, 1962, only
four members were elected from the Tokyo Metropolitan District, which had a
population of 5,922,100 voters, while one member was elected from the
Tottori District, with a population of only 362,182 voters. The petitioner filed
suit in the Tokyo High Court, challenging the validity of the 1962 election on
the grounds that the disparity between the two districts in the ratio of
electoral population per Councillor was 1 to 4.09, and that this disparity
violated the Constitution. According to the petitioner, the election violated
13. Law No. 67, 1986 (amending Public Officials Election Act).
14. Amami Oshima is now the only single-member district. See Public Officials Election Act, By-
Law No. 10.
15. Koshiyama v. Tokyo Metropolitan Election Comm'n, 18 Minshui 270 (Sup. Ct., G.B., Feb. 5,
1964).
16. Shimizu v. Osaka Election Comm'n, 37 Minsh6 345 (Sup. Ct., G.B., Apr. 27, 1983).
17. 18 Minshu 270.
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Article 14, section 1, which guarantees the principle of equality under law;
Article 44 (proviso), which prohibits irrational restrictions on the right to
vote; and Article 15, section 3, which guarantees universal suffrage. Since the
high court did not agree, the petitioner appealed to the Supreme Court,
which held, first, that the proportion of the voting population to a Diet
member was not the single absolute standard to be considered in determining
the apportionment of the Diet, although it was a main one. Second, the Court
held that the apportionment of Diet seats was within the province of the Diet's
discretionary powers, except in cases where malapportionment created
extreme inequality in the enjoyment of the right to vote; therefore, the
apportionment could not be deemed to violate the constitutional requirement
of equality under law solely because it was not in proportion to the voting
population. Finally, the Court held that the maximum disparity of 1 to 4.09
between electoral districts was not unconstitutional. 18
The significance of this decision was that, while declaring that the
apportionment of Diet seats was a matter of legislative policy, the Court
proclaimed the issue to bejusticiable in cases where an extreme inequality in
the voter's enjoyment of the right to vote had been created. Most
constitutional lawyers in Japan evaluated the Court's stance with some
reservation for not having resorted to the "political question" doctrine. They
were critical, however, of the Court's interpretation that the maximum
disparity of 1 to 4.09 between electoral districts in the value of a vote was not
unconstitutional. The Court had undeniably been much influenced in this
case by the Reynolds v. Sims decision, handed down in 1964 by the United
States Supreme Court. 19
18. The Court noted that:
[T]he Constitution does not make special provision for the number of members in both
Houses, electoral districts and other matters pertaining to elections, but leaves these
matters to be fixed by law, for determination of matters with respect to elections is in
principle left to the discretionary powers of the National Diet .... Neither Article 14 nor
Article 44 nor any other provision in the Constitution explicitly requires the number of Diet
members to be allocated in proportion to the number of electors in each district.
It is desirable, under the constitutional principle of equality under law, to allocate Diet
seats to each electoral district in proportion to the number of electors, and even though it is
undeniable that the proportion of the number of electors is a main factor to be considered
in apportioning Diet seats to an electoral district, it is also permissible to take other factors
into account. For example, under the system of electing half the members of the House of
Councillors every three years under Article 46 of the Constitution, it is difficult to reduce
the minimum number of two Councillors per district, however small the population of
electors in a district might be. In addition, such factors as the size of an electoral district, its
historical background, a balance in the number of Councillors between administrative
districts, etc., for example, are also worth considering, and it is not irrational to take them
into account in determining the allocation of Diet seats .... Even if the inequality was
created due to the failure to revise Schedule II of the present Public Officials Election Act in
proportion to the number of electors, the inequality as it now stands still remains a matter
of propriety, not a matter of constitutionality.
Id. at 272-73.
19. 377 U.S. 533.
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IV
APPORTIONMENT AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENT OF
EQUALITY UNDER LAW: KUROKAWA V. CHIBA ELECTION
COMMISSION
The Japanese Supreme Court's first decision on the constitutionality of
Schedule I of the Public Officials Election Act, which provided for the
apportionment of members of the House of Representatives, is the Grand
Bench Decision of April 14, 1976, Kurokawa v. Chiba Election Commission.20 In
Kurokawa, the petitioner was a voter in the First District of Chiba who filed suit
in the Tokyo High Court, contending that, since the maximum relative
difference between electoral districts in the value of a vote had reached 1 to
4.99, the rules of apportionment at the time of the election of December 10,
1972, violated Articles 14, 15, and 44 of the Constitution, and that the
election was therefore invalid. The Tokyo High Court, relying on the
Supreme Court Grand Bench decision of 1964 concerning the rules of
apportionment for members of the House of Councillors, held that (1) the
apportionment and districting were constitutionally left to the discretion of
the Diet; (2) the apportionment could not be said to violate the principle of
equality under law solely on the ground that it was not in proportion to the
number of voters, except in cases where extreme inequality in the enjoyment
of the voter's right to vote had been created; and (3) the imbalance in the ratio
of the voting population per Representative at the time of the 1972 election
had not reached a constitutionally intolerable degree. Consequently, the high
court dismissed the suit.
On appeal, the Supreme Court, recognizing electoral equality as a
constitutional requirement, held that the apportionment and districting for
members of the House of Representatives were unconstitutional in their
entirety at the time of the 1972 election, for, although the maximum relative
difference in the value of a vote between districts had exceeded the
permissible limits of the Diet's discretion, they had not been revised within a
reasonable period of time as demanded by the Constitution. The Court
further held that, although the election at issue in the present case was based
on unconstitutional apportionment and was invalid, the petition for
invalidation of the election was denied because the general principle of law
implied in the Administrative Case Litigation Act 2' authorized the court to
preserve defective administrative acts if it found that great harm to the public
interest would result if the act were invalidated.22
20. 30 Minshfi 223.
21. Gyosei Jiken Sosho H6 (Administrative Case Litigation Act), Law No. 1139, 1963, art. 31,
§ 1. A decision based on Article 31, section 1, is called afijo-Hanketsu or "circumstance decision," for
it considers the degree of damage a plaintiff suffers, the method of reparations to be taken,
prevention of further damage, and all other circumstances.
22. The Court stated:
The principle of equality under law provided for in Article 14, section 1 of the
Constitution requires, with respect to the right to vote, that all people have perfect political
equality. It is proper to interpret such provisions as Article 15, section 1, etc., to not only
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This decision made clear that electoral equality was a constitutional
requirement and that the maximum relative difference between districts of 1
to 4.99 in the ratio of the electoral population per Representative was
unconstitutional. However, the Court held that, even if the disparity in the
value of a vote between districts was acknowledged to have exceeded the
bounds of the Diet's discretion, the apportionment rules would not be
unconstitutional for that reason alone. They would be unconstitutional only if
they had not been revised within a reasonable period of time. It is
noteworthy, too, that the Court, while declaring the election invalid as based
on the unconstitutional rules of apportionment, also vacated the petition to
nullify that election by resorting to the technique of the "circumstance
decision"2 3 provided for in Article 31, section 1, of the Administrative Case
Litigation Act.
prohibit discrimination in the qualification of voters, but also to require equality in the
content of the right to vote, namely, to require the consideration of the value of each
citizen's right to vote....
The rules of apportionment should not be rendered unconstitutional only because the
difference of the ratio is in violation of electoral equality. It is only permissible to interpret
[the rules] as unconstitutional when [the rules have] not been revised in the light of
demographic shifts within a reasonable period of time demanded by the Constitution....
When we see the rules of apportionment at issue in the present case from this point of
view, we can comprehend that a remarkable imbalance in the ratio of electoral population
per Representative under them had arisen due to the gradual shifts of the population, and
that, judging from the above-mentioned difference in the ratio which existed at the time of
the election in the present case, the imbalance had, long before the election, reached a
degree which was presumed to violate the constitutional requirement of electoral equality.
... Considering that this law had nevertheless not been revised for eight years from the
date of the 1964 revision to the time of the election .... we have to admit that the revision
was not made within a reasonable period of time as demanded by the Constitution.
Therefore, the rules of apportionment in the present case should have been declared
unconstitutional because they violated the constitutional requirement of electoral equality
at the time of the election. ...
With respect to the rules of apportionment in the present case, then, they are
unconstitutional, and, therefore, the election held based on them does not conform with the
constitutional requirement, as mentioned above. However, even if the rules of
apportionment and the election based thereupon are interpreted as being invalid, this does
not immediately bring about a constitutionally invalid situation, but rather the result is that
all Representatives elected at the election will be disqualified from the beginning. This will,
as a consequence, not only render of questionable validity those laws and other acts made
by the resolution of the House of Representatives, which consists of those Representatives,
but even leaves the House of Representatives incapable of revising legislation that has been
declared unconstitutional. This is clearly a situation the Constitution does not anticipate.
It must be considered that the Administrative Case Litigation Act, a general procedural
law for suits contesting the validity of administrative acts, provides in ... Article 31, section
1 that, even if administrative acts are defective, the Court may choose not to invalidate them
in cases where it is deemed gravely harmful to the public interest in light of certain
situations. This provision, which was enacted on the basis of a legislative policy, is also
thought to contain elements to be understood as based on general principles of law which
do not confine it to cases of invalidation of administrative acts.
Relying on the spirit of the above-mentioned provision, we find it proper to vacate the
appeal for invalidation of the election itself, and only declare it invalid in the text of the
judgment, although the election at issue is invalid because it was held on the basis of rules of
apportionment which violated the Constitution.
30 Minshfi at 243, 248-54.
23. See supra note 21.
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The Grand Bench decision of 1976 is still a leading case among
reapportionment cases in Japan. Although Schedule I of the Public Officials
Election Act was revised in 1975, the maximum relative difference at that time
in the ratio of the number of electors per Representative between districts was
1 to 2.92, because the revision was made according to the 1970 National
Census. When the election for members of the House of Representatives was
held in June 1980, the discrepancy had reached a level of 1 to 3.94.
Concerning the validity of the 1980 election, the Supreme Court, on
November 7, 1983, held as follows:
(1) It is acknowledged that the inequality which was found by the Grand Bench
Decision of 1976 to exist at the time of the 1972 election had not been corrected;
(2) judging from the fact that the election at issue for members of the House of
Representatives was held about five years after the promulgation, and three and
one-half years after the enforcement of the revised law, we must say it is difficult to
conclude that the revision to correct the inequality had not been made within a
reasonable period of time as demanded by the Constitution; and
(3) the petition to nullify the election is therefore vacated.2 4
This decision implies that the Supreme Court of Japan considers the
permissible limits of the imbalance in the value of a vote to be a 1 to 3 ratio
and the "reasonable period" for correcting the imbalance to be five years. In
sum, the Grand Bench decision of 1983 suggests that, although the maximum
disparity of 1 to 3.94 between districts was in a "state of unconstitutionality,"
a reasonable period of time for correcting the imbalance had not yet elapsed,
and therefore, the rules of apportionment on which the election at issue was
based could not be judged unconstitutional.
Of six Justices who dissented in this decision, Justices Nakamura,
Taniguchi, and Yasuoka took the view that a maximum disparity of 1 to 3 at
the time of election was the permissible limit of imbalance, 25 while Justices
Dando and Yokoi thought a disparity of 1 to 2 was the maximum allowable
limit. 26 All of them, however, agreed that the petition to nullify the election
should have been vacated according to the spirit of Article 31, section 1 of the
Administrative Case Litigation Act, even though the election based on the
unconstitutional apportionment rules was invalid. Also, all those who
24. 37 Minshfi 1243.
25. Id. at 1278 (Nakamura, J., dissenting); id. at 1303 (Yasuoka, J., dissenting). At that time,
Justice Taniguchi did not clearly state that 1 to 3 was the permissible limit of the imbalance, but
expressly said so in his dissenting opinion in Kanao v. Hiroshima Election Comm'n, 39 Minshfi 1100,
1131 (Sup. Ct., G.B., July 17, 1985).
26. 37 Minshii at 1270 (Dando, J., dissenting); id. at 1289 (Yokoi, J., dissenting). While
Professor Ashibe, Japan's leading constitutional law scholar, has been insisting that 1 to 2 is the
maximum allowable limit under the Constitution, Ashibe, Gi'in Teisu Haibun Kitei Iken Hanketsu no Igi
to Mondaiten (Significance and Problems Concerning the Decision of Unconstitutionality on Apportionment for
Members of the Diet), 617 JURISTO 43 (1976), Professor Abe, another leading constitutional law scholar,
states that 1 to 2.5 constitutes an "extreme inequality" which violates the electoral equality required
by the Constitution. Abe, Ippyo no Kakusa to Ho nj moto no Byodo (Variance in the Value of a Vote and
Equality under Law), 830 JURISTo 54 (1985).
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dissented, except for Justices Yokoi and Yasuoka, suggested that they might
invalidate an election in the future if the situation were not improved. 27
On December 18, 1983, a month after the Supreme Court handed down
the above decision declaring a disparity of 1 to 3.94 to be in a "state of
unconstitutionality," an election for Representatives was held on the basis of
the rules of apportionment, which, despite the court's warning, 28 had not
been revised. The maximum relative difference in the ratio of the electoral
population per Representative between the Fourth District of Chiba and the
Fifth District of Hyogo at the time of the election had reached 1 to 4.40.
Consequently, voters in twenty-one electoral districts challenged the election
in four high courts in Hiroshima, Osaka, Tokyo, and Sapporo. All of the
courts, while declaring the rules of apportionment unconstitutional, struck
down the suits by resorting to the technique of the circumstance decision.
The voters immediately appealed to the Supreme Court. In July 1985,
however, the Supreme Court affirmed the lower courts' decisions and vacated
the petition to nullify the election. The opinion of the Court can be
summarized as follows:
(1) The maximum relative difference in the ratio at the time of the
1983 election had reached a degree that violated the
constitutional requirement of electoral equality;
(2) the revision to correct the inequality had not been made within a
reasonable period of time demanded by the Constitution; and
(3) although the election is declared invalid in the text of the
judgment, the petition to nullify it is vacated according to the
general principle of law implied in the circumstance decision of
Article 31, section 1, of the Administrative Case Litigation Act.29
The above opinion is basically a repetition of the Grand Bench decision of
1976. It is noteworthy, however, that the opinion was accompanied by a
concurring opinion ofJustices Terada, Kinoshita, Itoh, and Yaguchi, which, in
opposing the repeated use of the circumstance decision, suggested the
possibility of handing down a decision that would make an election
prospectively invalid after the lapse of a certain period of time (the so-called
Keikoku-Hanketsu prospective invalidation technique, which declares a warning
of unconstitutionality in the decision).30 The dissenting opinion of Justice
Taniguchi, which insisted that the election be invalidated immediately,3 1 and
the separate concurring opinion of Justice Kidoguchi, which expressed
agreement with both possibilities mentioned above, 32 are also noteworthy.
With respect to the possibility of using the technique of prospective
27. 37 Minshf at 1272-73 (Dando,J., dissenting); id. at 1286-87 (Nakamura,J., dissenting); id. at
1287 (Taniguchi, J., dissenting); id. at 1301 (Kidoguchi, J., dissenting).
28. See supra note 27.
29. 39 Minshu 1100.
30. Id. at 1125-26 (Terada, Kinoshita, Itoh and Yaguchi, JJ., concurring).
31. Id. at 1133-34 (Taniguchi, J., dissenting).
32. Id. at 1127 (KidoguchiJ., concurring).
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invalidation, the concurring opinion of Justices Terada, Kinoshita, Itoh, and
Yaguchi states as follows:
Since the validity of an election is judged in light of all those factors pointed out by
the majority opinion, we may have to invalidate an election if it is held based on
apportionment rules which have not been revised at all. Should we find it
inappropriate to immediately nullify the election, it is not impossible to hand down a
judgment making it prospectively invalid after the lapse of a certain period of time. 33
Under the influence of this decision and of popular sentiment strongly
critical of the Diet's negligence, revision of the rules of apportionment for
members of the House of Representatives was narrowly realized for the third
time in May 1986. This effort, known as the plan of "eight plus, seven
minus," was so perfunctory that it simply allocated one seat each to eight
grossly disadvantaged districts while depriving seven extremely favored
districts of one seat each. As a result, even immediately after the revision, the
maximum relative difference in the ratio of electoral population per
Representative between districts was still I to 2.99. In light of the still rapidly
changing social conditions in Japan, it is only a matter of time before further
serious inequality arises in the value of a vote between districts.
V
IMBALANCE IN APPORTIONMENT AND THE JUDICIAL REMEDY
In Japan, all reapportionment suits, including those mentioned above,
were brought under Article 204 of the Public Officials Election Act, which
gives all voters standing to file suit in a court of law in order to contest the
validity of an election. This provision, however, was originally designed to
nullify an illegally enforced election and to order a new election held. It is
evident that the legislators did not have reapportionment cases in mind when
they enacted Article 204, for under the provision, if an election is found
invalid by the Court, a new election must be held within forty days from the
day the challenged election has been invalidated.3 4 When an election is
nullified on the grounds that the apportionment law on which the election was
based is unconstitutional, the law must be revised and made constitutional
before a new election is held.3 5 Also, considering that Article 34, section 6,
requires the public announcement of an election eighteen days before an
election for Councillors and fifteen days before an election for
Representatives, it becomes utterly impossible to revise the rules of
apportionment within the periods fixed by Article 34, section 1, which are
twenty-two days in the case of Councillor elections and twenty-five days in the
case of Representative elections, after subtracting the period of public
announcement.
33. Id. (Tarada, Kinoshita, Itoh, and Yaguchi, JJ., concurring).
34. Public Officials Election Act, art. 34, § i.
35. Id. art. 204, § 1.
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The Supreme Court has nevertheless agreed to decide reapportionment
cases on the merits. The Grand Bench decision of April 14, 1976, for
example, stated the following:
The above suit is the only action whereby voters can contest the validity of an
election under the present system, and there is no other explicit opportunity in the
existing laws for the voters to ask the Court for revision of the Public Officials Election
Act on the ground that it is unconstitutional. In light of the constitutional
requirement that there should be means to correct, and provide a remedy for,
governmental acts which invade the fundamental rights of the people, it is not proper
to interpret the above provision as precluding voters from contesting the validity of an
election on the grounds that the apportionment law on which it is based is
unconstitutional.36
The stand taken by the Court, with which the great majority of Japanese
constitutional lawyers agree, is that decisions in reapportionment suits
brought under Article 204 should not be unreasonably evaded. Since there is
no other explicit means in the Constitution or in existing statutes for voters to
contest the constitutionality of apportionment rules, there should be ajudicial
remedy when voters' rights to electoral equality guaranteed by the
Constitution are violated. s7
In fact, however, an awkward situation will inevitably arise if an election is
judged invalid, for Article 204 requires that a new election be held within
forty days. If, as a result of a court's decision to invalidate the election, Diet
members in the affected electoral district would be disqualified and lose their
seats as legislators, reapportionment for the district would have to be made
without proper representation from their district. Furthermore, if the
decision is interpreted so as to affect all electoral districts throughout the
nation, all members of the affected House would be disqualified, which would
make it impossible for the Diet to revise the apportionment law in question.
Apportionment for Diet members is a question peculiarly political in
nature, and one with which the judiciary does not wish to be involved, if at all
possible. In 1946, United States Supreme Court Justice Felix Frankfurter
pointed out in Colegrove v. Green that "Courts ought not to enter this political
thicket."3 8 In Japan, when a suit was brought challenging the validity of the
1962 election for members of the House of Councillors to be elected from
local districts, the Japanese Supreme Court, apparently under the influence of
Reynolds v. Sims, chose to adopt the theory of legislative discretion without
reverting to the "political question doctrine."3 9 As mentioned above,
however, the Court, emphasizing the peculiarities and uniquenesses of the
House of Councillors, 40 concluded that a maximum relative difference of 1 to
4 in the ratio of the electoral population per Councillor did not constitute an
36. 30 Minshfi at 251-52.
37. Id.
38. 328 U.S. 549, 556 (1946).
39. 18 Minshfi at 272-73.
40. For an explanation of the "peculiarities and uniquenesses of the House of Councillors," see
37 Minshfi at 349-51.
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"extreme inequality" in violation of the Constitution, thus skillfully evading a
constitutional judgment.4 1
On April 14, 1976, the Court finally declared unconstitutional the
apportionment rules for Representatives, under which the maximum relative
difference of the electoral ratio had reached 1 to 4.94.42 In that case,
however, knowing that it was impossible for the Diet to reapportion and have
a new election held within the period prescribed by Article 204 of the Public
Officials Election Act, the Court did not nullify the election itself, but instead
handed down a circumstance decision, invoking the spirit of Article 31,
section 1, of the Administrative Case Litigation Act. 4
3
The Court must have expected that the Diet would voluntarily revise the
apportionment law should it be declared unconstitutional. Expecting the Diet
to live up to the Court's expectations turned out to be excessively optimistic,
however, for the ruling Liberal Democratic Party had been receiving its main
support from the rural areas. In fact, even in the face of the 1976 Grand
Bench decision, the Diet did not dare try to take sweeping remedial measures,
but only made two minor revisions to barely evade a judgment of
unconstitutionality. Needless to say, it is impossible to keep pace with the
recent rapid shifts in the population by means of such perfunctory measures.
Despite the above two revisions, the maximum disparity between districts at
the time of the 1983 election for members of the House of Representatives
had reached as much as I to 4.40, and the Court, on July 17, 1985, while
declaring the election invalid, again decided to vacate a petition to nullify the
election by resorting to the technique of the circumstance decision.
There is no denying that the people's confidence in the judiciary will be
greatly impaired if the Court repeatedly resorts to the circumstance decision
to avoid nullifying an election simply because a nullification would give rise to
uncontrollable governmental confusion. However, the Court can hardly be
considered unreasonable in hesitating to hand down a decision to nullify the
election, because such a decision would unmistakably bring about chaos in
government. Although it has given voters standing to file suits contesting the
constitutionality of the rules of apportionment under Article 204, the
Japanese Supreme Court has since been in a dilemma whether to repeat the
technique of the circumstance decision or to nullify the election resolutely,
whatever the consequences.
It is noteworthy that five Justices wrote concurring opinions in the Grand
Bench decision of 1985, suggesting the possibility of handing down a decision
to make an election prospectively invalid. It is conceivable that they have
learned about this procedure from the West German Federal Constitutional
Court technique of declaring a warning of unconstitutionality in a decision.
As indicated above, this type of decision declares legislation unconstitutional,
but provides that the declaration will take effect only after a certain period of
41. 18 Minshu 273.
42. 30 Minshfi 223.
43. Administrative Case Litigation Act, supra note 21.
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time has elapsed. This technique was used in a famous West German
reapportionment case 44 in order to give the Bundestag time to revise the
apportionment law while at the same time holding it responsible for a
solution.
VI
CONCLUSION
In Reynolds v. Sims 4 5 the United States Supreme Court established the
principle of "one person, one vote" by affirming the lower court's decision,
which had issued an injunction to restrain a state from holding an election
based on an unconstitutional apportionment law, and ordered the state to
abide by a temporary apportionment plan the court imposed. Unlike the
United States Supreme Court, which has equity powers, the Japanese
Supreme Court has long been under the influence of the Continental
European legal tradition, and is thus considered unable to take such active
measures as those taken by its American counterpart in Reynolds. There are
no laws empowering Japanese courts to issue an injunction or mandamus; to
be sure, Japan has traditionally been a country of legal positivism, and judges
therefore hesitate to take any active measures without a statutory basis. The
1947 Constitution, however, adopted the Anglo-American judicial concept
and vested the courts of law with the power to determine the constitutionality
of legislation. With that power, theJapanese courts have, in fact, occasionally
performed a lawmaking function. 46 Calling attention to that fact, some
Japanese legal scholars write that it is unreasonably circumspect for the Court
to use repeatedly the circumstance decision method. These commentators
suggest that the Court may restrain the election commission from holding an
election based on unconstitutional apportionment rules, and instead order it
to hold an election based on new rules the Court imposes, unless the Diet
revises them.47 At the moment, none of the Supreme Court Justices goes so
far as to support this idea, but, as mentioned above, five Justices wrote
concurring opinions in the 1985 Grand Bench decision in which they opposed
repeating the circumstance decision technique a third time, and instead
suggested the possibility of handing down a decision of prospective
invalidation to give the Diet a little more time than the forty-day period
provided in Article 34, section 1, of the Public Officials Election Act.
Although the Japanese Supreme Court undeniably has been much influenced
by its American counterpart, there are still many basic differences between the
two courts in their attitudes toward reapportionment cases.
44. BVerfGE (Federal Constitutional Court Decisions) 16, 130 (1963).
45. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
46. Tanaka, Teisu Haibun Fubyodo ni Taisuru Shiho-teki Kyusai GJudicial Remedy for Imbalance in the
Apportionment of Diet Members), 830 JURISTo 41, 46 (1985).
47. Takahashi, Teisu Fukinko ken Hanketsu no Mondaiten to Kongo no Kadai (Problems and Solutions
Concerning the Decision of Unconstitutionality on Apportionment of Diet Members), 844 JURISTo 29 (1985);
Tanaka, supra note 46, at 42.
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Even if the Court followed the suggestion of the concurring Justices and
handed down a decision of prospective invalidation in the future, is there any
guarantee that the Diet would respond favorably to the decision? On this
point, the Japanese courts may obtain guidance by reviewing
reapportionment decisions of the West German Federal Constitutional Court.
In West Germany, a suit was filed with the Federal Constitutional Court,
challenging the validity of the 1961 election for members of the Bundestag on
the ground that the election had been held based on an apportionment law
that violated the Basic Law of West Germany. The Federal Constitutional
Court handed down a decision of prospective invalidation that held that the
election would be invalid unless the Bundestag reapportioned by the end of
the 1965 legislative session.48 Of course, had the Constitutional Court
nullified the election at once, the Bundestag, which consisted of members
elected under the election in question, would have ceased to exist, making it
impossible to revise the apportionment law. That is why West Germany's
Constitutional Court resorted to the technique of prospective invalidation
instead of invalidating the election at once. The West German Federal
Constitutional Court is vested with the means to ensure the enforcement of its
own decisions; for example, it can draw up an apportionment plan under
Article 35 of the Federal Constitutional Court Act. 49 Nevertheless, the Court
hesitated to do more than make the decision discussed above because it did
not want to be involved in the complex and burdensome problem of
reapportionment, nor did it want to confront the legislature on this issue.
The Bundestag, however, responding to the decision, corrected the imbalance
in question by revising the apportionment law in February 1964.50
Yet, it remains questionable whether the Japanese Diet would respond like
its German counterpart if the Supreme Court ofJapan hands down a decision
of prospective invalidation, giving the Diet time to revise the rules of
apportionment. Nevertheless, it is possible that the Supreme Court may hand
down a decision of prospective invalidation if the imbalance between districts
in the ratio of the electoral population per Diet member reaches a
constitutionally intolerable degree in the near future.
48. See BVerfGE 16, supra note 44.
49. "The Federal Constitutional Court may in its decision state who will execute it; it can also
regulate the type and method of execution in each individual case." Federal Constitutional Court
Act, art. 35.
50. BGBI (Federal Gazette) 1, 61 (1964).
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